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11.1  Introduction 
With some 90 nations about to embark on a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations  under GATT (General Agreement  on Tariffs  and 
Trade), there is concern that rules for “high-tech”  industries be high 
on the agenda. The United States has been the leader in expressing 
this view because it perceives that the products of its high-tech indus- 
tries will have (or could have) a long-run comparative advantage. Aho 
and Aronson (1985, 44) point out that “[tlhe United States pushed for 
work on high technology at the 1982 GATT Ministerial  Meeting, but 
did not convince other countries that high-technology industries should 
be handled any differently from other industries.” In fact, they say that 
“the initiative was so poorly defined that LDC (less-developed coun- 
tries) representatives asked how high-technology discussions could be 
related to transfer of technology, which is a legitimate question but not 
what the United States had in mind.”  More recently, in March 1984, 
the U.S. government officially called for new GATT negotiations in the 
area of high-tech goods. The United States informed the GATT Council 
meeting at that time that it would begin bilateral trade talks on high- 
tech goods with interested delegations. These were to be the basis for 
future council discussions.  Other countries, however, questioned the 
urgency of these negotiations. 
Why is it useful to think of high-tech trade separately, and why has 
the interest in trade policy for these industries been on the upswing? 
The two questions are closely related. There are two reasons for this 
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increase in interest. First, trade in these products has been a growing 
part of total trade. Second, a number of high-tech industries possess 
certain characteristics  that provide opportunities for currently legal 
(under GATT rules) and profitable unilateral trade policy that could be 
harmful to all parties in the international arena if practiced by all par- 
ties.  In other words,  these characteristics  make the industries  “fall 
between the cracks” of trading arrangements that are meant to prevent 
such suboptimal situations from arising. The importance of high-tech 
trade and the sector’s special characteristics  indicate that policy for 
this sector should be thought of separately and its special characteristics 
taken into account. 
US-EC trade currently totals about $108 billion a year. A breakdown 
of  the  leading items  exported  to and  imported  from  the  European 
Community can be found in the tables of the USITC publication “Op- 
erations of the Trade Agreements Program,”  37th Report, reproduced 
at the end of this paper as tables  11.1 and 11.2. 
It remains to identify the characteristics that make some high-tech 
industries special. The first characteristic is that network externalities 
play a significant role in determining the demand for the products of 
these industries. Network externalities are said to exist when the utility 
that a user derives from consuming a good and the user’s willingness 
to pay for a good increase with the number of people who also consume 
the good or are expected to do so. These externalities arise in a number 
of  ways, both directly and indirectly. In communications equipment, 
such as telephones, they arise directly. People derive a greater benefit 
from a phone if  all the people  they  wish to communicate with also 
possess a phone. They may arise indirectly, for example, if the amount 
of software produced is related to the number of computers in use, so 
that increases in the number of computers would increase the available 
stock of software which in turn would raise peoples’ willingness to pay 
for a computer. 
Such network externalities arise for many products that are not “high- 
tech”-for  example, they arise for many durable goods since the avail- 
ability of servicing for any durable good is likely to be related to the 
number of units of  the good already sold in the market.’ The network 
externalities are especially important, however, in such key high-tech 
industries as computers and telecommunications systems. In part, this 
is because these and a number of other high-tech goods are information- 
related, and goods with this characteristic tend to have greater network 
externalities. 
For industries in which network externalities are important, expec- 
tations about the size of the network, i.e., the number of units of the 
good sold, are a major determinant of  the demand for such goods.* 287  High-Tech Trade Policy 
This paper analyzes how network externalities and expectations about 
their size can provide a special role for trade policy.  The conditions 
for such a role to exist are shown to be quite severe. Other charac- 
teristics  of high-tech  industries that may also serve as the basis for 
government intervention in international trade are briefly mentioned at 
the end of the paper. 
Recent work in international  trade theory has led both academics 
and policy makers to a better understanding of trade policy in imper- 
fectly competitive  market^.^  It is now understood that to the extent 
that national interests do not include the well-being of foreigners, in 
particular of foreign firms, there may be a case for trying to draw away 
the profits of foreign firms. This can be done directly, or  if this is illegal, 
indirectly, by altering the behavior of domestic firms in order  to improve 
their strategic position. Attention has focused on the use of taxes and 
subsidies for such purposes. 
This point was first made in Brander and Spencer (1984) who showed 
that in a particular strategic setting government subsidization of a do- 
mestic firm competing with a foreign firm in a foreign market would 
improve the domestic firm’s strategic position if no other governments 
attempted this as well. As might be expected, this conclusion aroused 
a good deal of interest in many circles. 
It has become clear through recent work4 that the appropriateness 
of this kind of policy depends very much on the nature of the strategic 
setting. Loosely speaking, if the firms5  choose their actions on the basis 
of incorrect beliefs about the actions of other firms and the government 
understands how these are incorrect and can precommit to taxhbsidy 
schemes, there is a role for government policy to correct the distortion 
arising from the incorrect beliefs of the firms. If, for example, a do- 
mestic  firm  expects its foreign rival  to keep sales constant while  it 
increases its sales, and in fact its foreign competitors tend to reduce 
their sales whenever this happens, a wedge exists that can be exploited 
by a knowledgeable government. In this case the government would 
give the domestic firm a strategic advantage by subsidizing it. In con- 
trast, if  the foreign competitor increased its sales with those of the 
domestic firm, the optimal policy would be imposition of a tax. 
The existence of consumer expectations about network size creates 
another possible role for government policy. In industries where ex- 
pectations of  network externalities are important, firms may believe 
that they are unable to influence expectations. This may be an incorrect 
assumption. If, for example, firms believe  that an increase in  their 
output will not increase the expected network size on which consumers 
base their purchasing decisions, while consumers really do  adjust their 
expectations about network size in response to output changes, then 288  Kala Krishna 
there is a role for a government that knows the true relationship to 
offset the incorrect beliefs of firms with a subsidy that would induce 
the firms to produce more. 
Another possibility, that in view of  existing GATT rules is perhaps 
more disturbing, relates to the existence of strategic multimarket inter- 
actions.6 Such interactions are bound to be important in those high- 
tech  industries  where  expected network  size affects demand  in  all 
markets, domestic and foreign. There is a possible role for the gov- 
ernment in trying to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms by an 
appropriate policy for domestic firms exporting to foreign markets. 
Under these conditions a purely domestic policy, such as a tax/subsidy 
on consumption for the domestic market only will have repercussions 
for the firm’s behavior in foreign markets. 
The basic idea can be understood quite easily with a simple example. 
Consider a situation where the individual firm takes expectations about 
network size as given. The firm is assumed to compete in both foreign 
and domestic markets. Network expectations adjust to network size 
so that in equilibrium the expected network size is the actual one. If 
the government subsidizes only national sales of the product, the firm 
will  produce more.’  This, in  turn, will  raise expectations about the 
network size of the product at home and abroad, and therefore affect 
the product’s international competitiveness. This natural interdepen- 
dence of markets via network effects could be used strategically by a 
government to affect a firm’s behavior in international markets in order 
to promote the national interest.8 
This possibility is particularly disturbing as trade laws are designed 
to deal with direct government subsidization of exported goods, but 
are not framed in a way to deal with purely domestic policies that have 
indirect international effects. Under GATT rules, countervailing duties 
are allowed if  there is a foreign subsidy on a product and imports of 
the product cause material injury or retardation of growth to the do- 
mestic industry producing the same good. Thinly disguised subsidies 
to exports are prevented under this clause. An example is the “x radial 
steel-belted tires” case in which Canada subsidized a tire company to 
build a new factory in an area with high unemployment. Since virtually 
all of the product was to be exported and thus likely to cause material 
injury to U.S. competitors, it was found to be countervailable. The 
countervailing duty provisions clause cannot be used, however, in the 
case of  “purely  domestic”  policies,  i.e.,  where the subsidy applies 
only to goods consumed domestically. This leaves only the last resort, 
the escape clauses, as the means to deal with  such policies.  These 
provisions can be used if  increased imports cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers or if increased imports threaten national 
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are quite stringent, however.  Thus, “purely domestic”  policies with 
favorable effects on international competitiveness could look quite at- 
tractive as a means of promoting exports. 
The next sections present  a  simple  model  that helps  isolate and 
interpret the effects of  network externalities and expectations on op- 
timal  trade policy.  Two versions of the model are considered in the 
next two sections. Section 11.2 examines the implications for profit- 
shifting possibilities of the two previously mentioned characteristics of 
high-tech industries, network externalities and expectations about them. 
Section 11.3 contains an analysis of  the nature of multimarket  inter- 
actions that occur because of these characteristics and the implications 
of these interactions for trade policy. The last section discusses some 
other characteristics of high-tech industries and the problems they may 
and do cause for trade policy. 
11.2  Expectations, Network Externalities, and Profit Shifting 
Recent work on the role of government policy  when oligopolistic 
firms operate in international markets has focused on the possibility of 
profit shifting from foreign to domestic firms and on the trade-off be- 
tween the gains to domestic firms from such profit  shifting and the 
losses to domestic consumers. A  number of  recent papers have de- 
veloped this idea. One of the earliest papers is by Brander and Spencer 
(1984), who show in a model with one home firm and one foreign firm 
acting as Cournot duopolists and competing in a third market, that the 
optimal government policy is to subsidize  exports. Dixit (1984) extends 
this result  to cases with many firms and shows that the same result 
holds as long as the number of  domestic firms is not too great. Eaton 
and Grossman (1986), in  an insightful  paper,  show that the Brander 
and Spencer result can be interpreted as  a special case of a more general 
policy. Their basic interpretation is in terms of a government acting in 
response to differences between conjectured and actual responses of 
foreign firms to changes in the domestic firms’ output when they are 
competing in a third market.9 They also develop a number of exten- 
sions, including allowing for many firms and domestic consumption. 
As argued previously, demand for a firm’s product depends on the 
expected size of the “network,” that is, the expected number of units 
of compatible goods sold. These expectations are very important in 
industries with  network externalities.  Government intervention may 
be useful in influencing these expectations. This idea is explored in this 
section using a model that embeds the Eaton and Grossman model in 
it.Io Use is made of the simplest version of the model that makes the 
point, namely, the case where a domestic and foreign firm compete in 
a third market and there is no consumption of the product in either the 290  Kala Krishna 
home or foreign country. Extensions along the lines of allowing more 
firms or domestic consumption are possible, and the interested reader 
can use Eaton and Grossman (1986) as a guide to do so. The next 
section analyzes multimarket interactions with firms competing in both 
the domestic and foreign markets. 
When network externalities exist, a consumer’s willingness to pay 
for a product depends on the expected network size for the product. 
The products of the two firms could be compatible or incompatible 
with each other, and are substitutes for each other. If  they are com- 
patible, expected network  size is the expected  total output of  both 
firms; if incompatible, the network is the expected output of each firm. 
The inverse demand functions for the home and foreign firms are given 
by P(x,x*,NE)  and P*(x,x*,Nt?,  where x,x* and NE,  WE  are the outputs 
and expected network sizes of the home and foreign firms, respectively. 
The superscript E denotes that these are the expected levels of these 
variables. If  the products are compatible, NE  = N*E  = xE + x*~.  If 
they are incompatible, NE = xE and WE  = x*~.  Of  course, price, P, 
falls as x or x* rises since the products are substitutes, and rises with 
increases in the expected network size. Similarly, P* rises as  rises 
and falls as x or x* rises.” 
Consumers are assumed to base their demand for a firm’s product 
on the expectations they hold about a firm’s network size. Firms take 
these expectations as dependent on their output. They assume that a 
unit change in x(x*) creates an E(E*)  change in the expected domestic 
(foreign) output with consequent effects on expected network size. The 
special case where expectations about network size do not change as 
the firm’s output changes arises when E and E* equal zero. However, 
in  general, expectations  are perceived as being affected by  a firm’s 
output. In addition, firms have conjectures about how their opponent 
will react to changes in  their output. y and y* denote the conjectural 
variations parameters of the domestic and foreign firms. 
Finally, expectations about network size must fulfill a consistency 
condition that allows them to be tied down. A natural condition is that 
expectations about the network sizes of the firms are fulfilled in equi- 
librium. This defines a “fulfilled expectations equilibrium.” It is useful 
expositionally to be slightly more abstract at this time. An (e,e*) fulfilled 
expectations equilibrium is said to occur when the expected domestic 
output equals e times actual domestic output, and expected foreign 
output equals e* times  actual foreign output. This corresponds to a 
fulfilled expectations equilibrium if  both e and e* equal one. 
The profits of the domestic and foreign firms are given by 
(1) 
and 
(1 - t)  P(x,x*,NE)x -  4x1 291  High-Tech Trade Policy 
(2)  P*(x,x*,"E)x*  - c(x*), 
respectively. 
t is the tariff or subsidy imposed on the domestic firm, and c(.)  and 
c*(.)  are the cost functions of the two firms. The first order conditions 
when the networks of the two products are incompatible are given by 
(3) 
(4) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The subscript  1, for ex- 
ample, identifies the first variable  as being the relevant one. If  the 
products are compatible, they are given by 
(3')  (1 - t)  {[PI  + yP2 + (E + E*Y)PJx  + P} - C'  = 0 
(4')  [P;y* + P; + (€*  + y*r)]x* + P* - c*' = 0. 
In addition, the (e, e*) fulfilled-expectations equations, 
(5)  xE = ex 
(6) 
must be met. Substituting (5) and (6) into (3) and (4) or (3') and (4') 
gives two equations to solve for the only two variables, x  and x* in 
these equations. Equations (5) and (6) then define expectations. There- 
fore, the effect of a change in t on the endogenous variables x and x* 
in such an equilibrium can be found by performing comparative statics 
analyses on (3) and (4)  or (3') and (4'), after substituting (5) and (6) 
into them. Let the actual change in x* as x changes be given by g.  This 
is defined by equations (4) or (47, after equations (5)  and (6) have been 
substituted into them. It also equals the ratio of the comparative statics 
(1 - t)  [(PI  + yP* +  EP3)X + PI  - c'  = 0, 
(P;y* + P; + €*P;)X*  + P* - c*' = 0, 




The problem  is  now fully specified.  Firms maximize their profits 
taking any taxes and subsidies by the government as given. These first- 
order conditions for the firms define their best-response functions which 
give two equations in x, x*, xE, and x*~.  The condition that the equi- 
librium be an (e,e*)  fulfilled expectations equilibrium gives another two 
equations in these four variables. This allows solving for the endoge- 
nous variables x, x*, xE, and x*~. 
The question of optimal government policy can now be analyzed. 
Since the firms compete in a third market, welfare consists only of 
domestic profits,12 and is given by  W = P(x,x*,NE)x - c(x). 
t does not affect welfare directly, since transfers between the gov- 
ernment and firms cancel out, but it does affect welfare by its effect 
on the endogenous variables. Hence, 292  Kala Krishna 
(7) 
dx  --  - [(P,  + P2g + P3e)x + P - c’]-  dW 
dt  dt 
if the products are incompatible, and 
dW  dx 
-  = {[PI  + P2g + P3(e + ge*)]x  + P - c’} - 
dt  dt  (7‘) 
if they are compatible. 
welfare changes to be expressed as 
Using the first-order condition (3)  in (7) and (3’) in  (7‘) allows the 
if the products are incompatible, and by 
if the products are compatible. 
The first-order conditions for an interior welfare maximum require 
(8) or (8’) to be zero depending on whether the products are incom- 
patible  or  compatible.  This gives  the optimal  policy  assuming that 
second-order conditions are met.  Notice that the optimal value of  t 
depends on the direction of  both the wedge between conjectured and 
actual responses of the foreign firm to own output changes, (g - y), 
5 la  Eaton and Grossman, as well as on the difference between the 
conjectured change in expected network size in response to own output 
and the actual change. This difference depends only on (e -  E) if prod- 
ucts are incompatible, but on the additional interaction term (ge* -  ye*) 
as well when products are compatible. 
Consider first the case when products are incompatible. The differ- 
ence between g and y defines a reason for the government to set t # 0. 
If g <  y and e  = E, the government should subsidize the domestic pro- 
ducer. This is because the domestic firm is too pessimistic in its conjec- 
ture about the foreign firm’s behavior. If, for example, y  = 0 and g < 0, 
the usual Cournot case, the domestic firm acts on the assumption that 
the foreign one will keep its output fixed. However, since its opponent 
actually reduces its output in response to any increase in domestic out- 
put, the domestic firm should produce more. The government can en- 
sure this by subsidizing the domestic firm, as was pointed out by Eaton 
and Grossman. 
The interpretation of (e -  E)  is similar. If e > E, the domestic firm 
should be subsidized since the firm conjectures a smaller change in the 293  High-Tech Trade Policy 
expectations of consumers about network size in response to output 
changes than actually occurs. This leads them to produce too little. If, 
for example,  firms take  the expected  network  size as given, and  a 
fulfilled-expectations equilibrium is considered, there would be reason 
to subsidize the domestic firm. Expectations are likely to be fixed in 
the short run, and a fulfilled-expectation condition can be thought of 
as a static way of incorporating the longer run into the model.I3 If firms 
tend to take a short-term view of the industry, as is implicit in E = 0, 
there is a role for a government that is aware of the long-run conse- 
quences to take appropriate action. 
The interpretation of the case with compatible products is similar. 
The only difference lies in the fact that any effect of a tariff via the 
network externality must include the effect on the foreign firm’s ex- 
pected and actual output as well as that of the domestic firm. Notice 
that e  + ge* is the actual change in the network size, while E  + YE* is 
the conjectured change in the network size. This makes E and y interact 
in the formula, but allows the same interpretations to be made as done 
previously. 
It is worth calling attention to a few points at this stage. First, it 
should be noted that g is the slope of the foreign firm’s best-response 
function after imposing the expectations condition on it. In this it differs 
from the analogous concept in the absence of any expectations. There- 
fore, even if  e  = E, the introduction of  expectations  would tend to 
make the assumption g  = y even stronger since g  is not the slope of 
the best response function of the foreign firm for given expectations 
but when expectations are fulfilled in the (e,e*)  sense. 
Second, if E =  1 = e and a firm fully takes into account the effects 
of  its actions on the network size, then in the case with incompatible 
products the direction of optimal policy depends on the sign of (g - y) 
only.  Also  notice  that  the  direction  of  the  optimal  policy  when 
e  = E =  1  = e*= E* in the case of compatible products is dependent 
on more than just the sign of (g - y). If  P2 + P3 is positive, even if 
P2  is negative, the goods would become effective complements because 
of the presence of network externalities. In this case the incentives to 
subsidize would, of course, be reversed since a decrease in output by 
a competitor hurts rather than helps a firm when the goods are com- 
plements.  Thus,  if  E = E* = e* = e  =  1, P2 + P3 is  positive,  and 
g < y  = 0, as in the Cournot case, the anticipation that the other firm 
would keep its output fixed would be too optimistic if it really lowered 
it. Obviously, the optimal policy  would then be a tax  which would 
correct the firm’s over-optimism. 
Third,  note that  having compatible products  tends to  reduce  the 
desirability of a subsidy or a tax when g = y < 0. Consider, for ex- 
ample, the case where e  = e*,  E = €- but e > E and g  = y < 0. The 
direct effect of a subsidy is beneficial since the firms underestimate the 294  Kala Krishna 
value  of the network externality. This is captured by  the P3(e -  E) 
term. A  subsidy, however,  raises the foreign firm’s network as well 
and tends to make it wish to produce more. If g < 0, this makes the 
domestic firm produce less. This is captured by the term P,g(e*  -  E*). 
This works against the desirability of a subsidy. 
Thus, network externalities and expectations regarding the size of 
the network affect optimal trade policy for oligopolistic industries in 
two ways. First, the presence of expectations effects creates a wedge 
if there are differences in the way the network externalities really work, 
as given by e and e*,  and the way they are expected to work, as given 
by  E and E*. This wedge creates a role for government taxatiodsubsi- 
dization to correct the “distortion.”  Second, when the goods are com- 
patible  the existence of  network externalities in  the absence of  any 
expectations distortions tends to make goods complementary. If in fact 
this effect dominates, the direction of optimal policy is reversed. 
In the next section, the importance of network externalities is shown 
to create a reason why success in one market can help bring about 
success in another. The analysis also provides an example of the idea 
that  import protection can act as export promotion, as in  Krugman 
(1984). 
11.3  Multimarket Interactions 
11.3.1  Introduction 
Multimarket interactions are said to exist when decisions made in 
one market spill over into another by affecting optimal decisions there. 
The existence of such interactions is important for two reasons. First, 
it creates problems  in identifying unfair trade practices  since purely 
“domestic”  policies could actually be trade policies in disguise. Sec- 
ond, such  interactions  are bound  to exist in  markets  with  network 
externalities, both because markets are linked by common networks 
and  because  expectations  about  network  size are a determinant  of 
demand and can be affected by domestic government policy. 
The topic of  multimarket  oligopolies has aroused  a great deal  of 
interest  recently.  The work  of  Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 
(1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Krugman (1984), and Baldwin and 
Krugman (1986) is closely related to this part of  the paper.  Baldwin 
and Krugman (1986) focus on an important technological aspect of the 
production of 16K RAMS: the fact that experience lowers the effective 
cost of production. This creates multimarket interactions that are made 
important by the extremely large experience effects estimated to occur 
in this industry. They develop a model that is rich enough to capture 
the particular aspects of learning-by-doing in this industry, and then 295  High-Tech Trade Policy 
use their theoretical structure in  a simulation exercise to see if  the 
effective closure of  the Japanese market to imports played a critical 
role in developing Japanese superiority in  this area. Their results in- 
dicate that this closure did indeed play a critical role.  In this spirit, 
any domestic policy that raised Japanese domestic output of semicon- 
ductors could have significant trade effects. 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) examine many examples 
of multimarket interactions. The core of their work is their definition 
of  “strategic complements and substitutes” and they show that these 
play a crucial role in the results of many oligopoly models.I4 The ap- 
proach of Eaton and Grossman (1986) can also be extended, as is done 
in  this paper, to better understand  such interactions in  markets with 
the characteristics  previously  mentioned.  This approach provides a 
way of understanding multimarket interactions that is complementary 
to that of Bulow, et al. (1985). It focuses on the wedges created by 
differences between how firms expect the relevant variables to affect 
profits and how they actually do so. These wedges create an oppor- 
tunity for possible government intervention. 
While many possibilities for multimarket interactions have been dis- 
cussed,  network  externalities  and  expectations  concerning network 
size have been neglected. In what follows, this paper will first discuss 
informally how such network externalities make “success” across mar- 
kets positively correlated and then examine in a more formal way the 
differences in the roles played by expectations and network external- 
ities in such interactions. 
11.3.2  Network Externalities, Expectations, and 
Market Interactions 
Both the existence of  network externalities and expectations about 
them create linkages between markets and give rise to the possibility 
that government policy in  one market can affect a firm’s competitive 
edge in another. 
Consider for example a firm operating in two markets, a home and 
a foreign  market, and facing the same competitor  in  both  of  these 
markets. Assume for concreteness that the two firms are Cournot multi- 
market duopolists who produce  incompatible  products  so that each 
firm’s expected network size is the size of its expected output in all its 
markets.  A fulfilled expectations  eq~ilibrium’~  where firms take ex- 
pectations about network size as given will be considered. Equilibrium 
is therefore characterized by each firm’s maximizing profits by choosing 
its sales in each market, taking as given its competitors’ output and 
expectations about network size. In order for expectations to be ful- 
filled, in equilibrium each firm’s total output must equal the expected 
network size as well. 296  Kala Krishna 
Any subsidy on domestic sales will tend to raise total output of the 
domestic firm and lower the total output of the foreign firm. In a fulfilled- 
expectations equilibrium, greater output will lead to greater expecta- 
tions about the network size of the domestic firm and smaller expec- 
tations of  the foreign network size. This will help the domestic firm 
and hurt the foreign firm in both markets. Notice that domestic policy 
has international effects because of  the role played by  expectations. 
The same kind of argument works even if firms do not take expectations 
as given but assume they are equal to their total output, since greater 
sales in  the  domestic  market  raise marginal revenue  in  the foreign 
market because of the effect of network externalities. Network exter- 
nalities by themselves also create multimarket interactions. 
The preceding argument can be made clearer by using a series of 
diagrams to illustrate the process (see figure 1 l.1).l6 It can be verified 
that the same kinds of effects occur even when the effects of output 
changes on expectations are taken into account by firms. Some notation 
is required at this point to help follow the diagrams used to illustrate 
the process by which these multimarket interactions occur. Since the 
products are incompatible, each firm’s network consists of  its total 
expected output in the two markets. The firm’s problem is, therefore, 
to 
Max .rr(x,ylx*,y*,NE)  = r(x,x*,NE)  + R(y,y*,NE) - c(x  + y), 
where x,y  are output levels of the domestic producer in the two markets; 
x*  and y* are the competitor’s outputs in  the markets; and c  is the 
constant marginal cost of the home firm.” NE  is the expected network 
size of the home firm. The home firm’s revenue functions in the two 
markets are r and R and are assumed to have the usual properties, r2, 
r,,,  rI2  < 0 and r3 > 0. It is also assumed that R2,  R22,  RI2  < 0 and 
R3 > 0. The home firm takes x*,y*,  and NE  as given. This is denoted 
by the profit function, IT, being conditional on given values of these 
variables. Similarly, the foreign firm’s problem is 
Max ~~*(x*,y*Ix,y,N~)  = r*(x,x*,N*E)  + R*(y,y*,N*E) 
X.Y 
x*y* 
- c*(x* + y*). 
Therefore, equilibrium in the home market (depicted in figure ll.l(a)), 
where the revenue functions of the home and foreign firm are given by 
rand r*, is characterized by the intersection of the best response func- 
tions, 6,  b*, implicitly defined by  IT^  = 0 and IT:*  = 0. Similarly, equi- 
librium in the foreign market (shown in figure  1 l.l(b)) is defined by 
rTY  = 0 and IT;*  = 0. Both these equations hold at the intersection of 
B  and B* which are defined by these equations. The usual stability Y 
45" 
I Y  I 
Fig. 11.1 298  Kala Krishna 
conditions are also assumed in figures 11. I(a) and (b). These are equi- 
libria only for the given expectations, however. In addition, these ex- 
pectations must be fulfilled. For a given WE,  it is easy to verify that 
increases in NE  shift the home firm's best response function outwards 
in both markets and so raise its equilibrium output in both markets. 
Therefore total output, N,  of the domestic firm rises with NE  as shown 
in figure Il.l(c) by N(N3 = NE. 
What happens to A as N*E  changes? Since an increase in N*E  shifts 
B" and b* outward, it must reduce N for any NE.  Thus, an increase in 
shifts N(N3  inwards so that the NE  that is self-fulfilling falls. This 
relationship between the self-fulfilling NE  and N*E  is depicted in figure 
Il.l(e) as NE(W3.  Since the position of the two firms is symmetric, 
the same arguments produce another diagram, Il.l(d), which is anal- 
ogous to 1 l.l(c), and another function, WE(N3,  depicted in  1  l.l(e), 
which for any NE  gives the expectation of WE  that is  self-fulfilling. 
The intersection of these two loci, WE(N3  and NE(W3,  gives the set 
of expectations about NE  and WE  which are  jointly self-fulfilling. Once 
again, the relative slopes of these two functions are as shown for sta- 
bility reasons. 
How would a subsidy program for production for the domestic firm 
affect a firm abroad? The direct effect of a subsidy with given expec- 
tations about network size would be to shift the best response function 
at home outwards to b', as shown in figure ll.l(a). This raises total 
output of the domestic firm for the given expectations.  In fact, it is 
easy to show that total output rises for any given expectations. Thus, 
for any N*E,  N(N3  would shift to the right, to a line such as N' in 
figure ll.l(c). Hence, for any N*E,  the self-fulfilling expectation of NE 
would rise, or in other words, NE(N*3  would shift outwards to a line 
such as NE',  in figure lI.l(e). 
Moreover, since the subsidy reduces total foreign output with the 
original set of expectations, it must reduce total foreign output for any 
given set of expectations, or in other words it must shift W(N3  inwards 
to N*' as in  1 1. l(d). This reduces the self-fulfilling expectation level of 
N*€ for any NE,  so that WE(NE)  shifts in as well to WE',  which is 
shown in ll.l(e). Both the shifts in figure ll.I(e)  raise the jointly self- 
fulfilling level of NE  and lower that of WE.  This shifts demand for the 
domestic product out and the foreign product in in both domestic and 
foreign markets, shifting the equilibrium in these markets to the points 
f and F from a and A in Il.l(a) and 11.1 (b), respectively. 
A subsidy to the home firm in the home market raises expectations 
about its network size, which raises its output in all markets. A similar 
effect could easily be demonstrated even if firms completely take into 
account the effects of output changes on expectations, because the size 
of the network still connects the two markets. 299  High-Tech Trade Policy 
Although this exercise shows how expectations and network exter- 
nalities can link markets and how a subsidy to domestic sales can raise 
foreign and domestic sales, it does not say much about whether this 
subsidy is desirable. Fortunately, the model developed in the previous 
section can be extended to help answer these questions. The only 
modification that needs to be made is to allow the firms to compete in 
two markets. The case where firms  make incompatible products is 
analyzed first. The results for compatible products are similar and are 
presented more briefly later on. 
The domestic (foreign) firm is assumed to behave as if it believed 
that a unit change in the domestic (foreign) network would lead to an 
E(E*)  change in its expected network. y and r are the conjectural vari- 
ations parameters for the domestic firm in the home and foreign market, 
and y* and r*  are the conjectural variations parameters for the foreign 
firm in the home and foreign markets. r and R are the revenue functions 
of the domestic firm in the domestic and foreign markets, respectively. 
r* and R* similarly denote the revenues of the foreign firm in  these 
markets. An (e,e*)  fulfilled expectations equilibrium is analyzed as be- 
fore. Domestic consumption of the domestic firm's output is taxed or 
subsidized by the government at the rate t. Hence, the profits,  IT,  of 
the domestic firm are given by 
IT  = (1 - t)r(x,x*,NE)  + R(y,y*,NE)  -  c(x + y), 
and IT*, the profits of  the foreign firm, are given by 
IT*  = r*(x,x*,N*E)  + R*(Y,Y*,N*~)  - c*(x* + y*). 
The four first-order conditions are given by 
(9) 
an* 
-  = r;  + y*r; + E*r; + E*R;  - 
ax* 
c* = 0 
an 
aY 
_-  - R, + I'RZ + eR3 + er3(l - t) - c  = 0  (1 1) 
an* 
-  = R; + I"R; + E*RS + E*r; - c* = 0. 
aY* 
The first two equations define equilibrium in the home market given 
y*,x*,  and the second two define equilibrium in the foreign market given 
x,y. The condition that expectations be (e,e*)  fulfilled requires that in 
addition NE = e(x + y)  and WE  = e*(x* + y*).  These conditions will 
give the equilibrium levels of x, x*,  y  and y* as a function only of t. 300  Kala Krishna 
Also, comparative statics on the system will give the effects of changing 
t on these endogenous variables. These comparative statics results are 
dxdx* dy  dy* 
dt  dt  dt  dt 
denoted by -,  -,  -,  and -  and can be found by substituting for 
the expectations conditions in equations (9) through  (1  2) before per- 
forming the comparative statics exercise. 
For simplicity, the welfare function is broken into two components, 
consumer surplus, W,  and profits,  Wn.  The effects of  r  on the two 
components are analyzed separately. This isolates the strategic multi- 
market profit-shifting  effects, so that they can be analyzed clearly. 
Notice that in (13), welfare depends on t only indirectly via the effect 
oft  on the endogenous variables. 
(13)  Wn = r[x,  XI,  e(x + y)1  + R[y,  y*, e(x + y)] - c(x  + y). 
dx  dx*  --  - (r, + r3e + R,e - c)-  + (r2)-  d Wn 
dt  dt  dt  (14) 
dY  dY*  + (R, + R3e + r3e - c)-  + (R2)- 
dt  dt 
Using equations (9) and (1 1) we can substitute for r, - c and R, - c 
in equation (14). Also, let g  be the actual change in X* relative to the 
actual change in x as  t changes. In other words, g  = -  dxldt  . Similarly, 
dx*ldt 
Now, equation (14) can be expressed as 
dyldt  ,  and h = - 
dy*ldt  G=- 
dyldt  dxldt ’ 
d Wn 
dt  (15)  -  -  - {[(c -  R3E)t/(l - t)] + hw3t + (g - y)r2 
dx  + (G - T)R2h  + (rj + R3)(e -  ~)(1  + h)}-  . 
dt 
The first-order conditions for a welfare maximum will give t to be 
zero optimally if  actual changes due to a slight change in tariffs are 
equal to the conjectural changes, or if  g  = y, G = r,  and e  = E. 
The previous Cournot example can be analyzed in this framework 
by setting y  = 0 = r,  G < 0, g < 0, and E = 0, e  =  1, h > 0. Since 
(g -  y)r2 > 0 and (G - r)R2  > 0, these effects call for a subsidy on 
domestic production. This is the standard effect that depends on the 
form of competition, as pointed out by Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
Moreover, notice that although the subsidy is imposed at home, the 
effects of a subsidy are desirable in both markets. This is evident in 
there being two terms, one for the domestic market and one for the 301  High-Tech Trade Policy 
foreign market. A subsidy is desirable in the home market since the 
domestic firm is being too “pessimistic”  in its conjectures at home 
which leads it to produce too little and a subsidy alleviates this dis- 
tortion. This effect is captured by the term (g - y)r2 being positive. 
A  subsidy is desirable abroad because it causes the domestic firm’s 
output to rise in both markets so that h is positive, and because the 
domestic firm is being too pessimistic abroad as well. This is captured 
by the term (G - T)Rzh  being positive. 
Expectations affect revenues in both markets.  For this reason we 
see the term r3 + R, in equation (15). Since the effects of  a subsidy 
are direct at home and indirect abroad, we see the term (1 + h)  mul- 
tiplying the term (r3 + R,) in equation (15). Finally, since e -  E > 0 
in this case, firms are too conservative in their estimate of the network 
benefits of increased output. For this case, (r3 + R3)  (e -  E) (1  + h) 
is positive, since h is positive and the expectation effect just reinforces 
the previous effects. Therefore, the optimal policy would be a subsidy. 
This completes the analysis of  profit shifting in the Cournot example. 
If  E # 0, the sign of  the terms multiplying r  in  (1.5)  is ambiguous. 
However, as long as -  < 0 at r  = 0, similar arguments to those pre- 
viously made indicate the direction of welfare-increasing policies from 
an initial state of no taxes or subsidies on domestic consumption of 
the domestic good. If, for example, firms overestimate the effect of 
output on  network  expectations  so that  e -  E < 0, and  g  = y  and 
G = r, then a small tax  on domestic consumption of  the domestic 
firm’s product will raise welfare from the t = 0 welfare level. 
It is clear from the expression for the change in  welfare that the 
optimal policy depends not only on the form of the strategic interaction, 
as parameterized by r and r relative to g and G,  but also on the sign 
of  h. In  addition, it also depends on the distortions inherent in the 
expectations formulation.  l8 
dx 
dr 
Now to turn to the effects on consumer surplus, WC.I9 
(16) 
where U(.)  is the utility function being maximized. 
Wc =  U[x,  XI,  e(x  + y),  e*(x* + y*)] -  Y[X, XI,  e(x + y)] 
-r*[x, x*, e*(x* + y*)] 
Differentiating gives: 
+ yg  + -h  + TGh  -  y?  1: 
dw’  - [-  awc  aw  awC 
dr  ax  dx  aY 
(17) -  - 
= [(U, - r, + eU3 - er, - r;) + (U2 - r; -  r2 
dx 
dt  + U4e* -  r;e*)g + (U, - r,)eh  + (U, - r;)e*Ghl-  . 302  Kala Krishna 
The four terms in brackets give the effect of changes in x,  x*, y,  and 
y* because of changes in  t  on consumer surplus. Since U,  = P, the 
inverse demand function facing the domestic producer at home, U, -  r,  , 
is  positive.  Similarly,  U, - r;  is  also positive.  U, - r, is  positive/ 
negative if an increase in the network size raises utility more/less than 
it raises revenues. The sign of this term is ambiguous and depends on 
the particular specification of  demand used. A useful interpretation, 
along the lines of Spence (1976), can be made as follows. 
If increments in network externalities are valued less for marginal 
units  than for all units  on average, then U, -  r3 is positive.  If  the 
increments in network externalities are valued more for marginal units 
than for all units on average, then U3 - r3 is negative. This is because 
(18)  U3h,  x*, e(x  + Y), e*(x* + y")l -  rJx, x*, e(x  + y)1 
= kUJIb,  x*, e(x  + yllds -  P3[x,  x*, e(x  + y)lx 
The first term is the average willingness to pay for increments in the 
network size over all units purchased while the latter is the willingness 
to pay at the margin for increments in network size.20  The interpretation 
of U4 -  r; is similar to  this. Also, r; and r, are negative since the goods 
are substitutes. The effects of  a tax or subsidy on consumer surplus 
can now be analyzed. 
Assume that a tax lowers x. Consumer surplus is affected through 
four channels, x,  x*, y and y*, as shown. First consider the effect by 
means of x directly. A tax reduces x and since the fall in utility exceeds 
the fall in expenditure, this reduces consdmer surplus. This is captured 
by the term  U, - r, being  positive.  The fall  in  x  also reduces the 
network size. This is captured by U3 - r,. If  U3 - r, is positive, the 
fall in the network size will also reduce consumer surplus. If  U, - r3 
is negative, it will raise consumer surplus. Since the goods are substi- 
tutes, ri < 0 and the fall in x will raise the revenues of the foreign firm 
in  the domestic market which, for a given  level  of x*,  will  reduce 
consumer surplus. Therefore, the effect of a tax via x reduces consumer 
surplus as long as U3 -  r3 > 0. 
Now turn to the effect via x*. If the fall in x raises x*, i.e.,  g  < 0, 
< 0. A tax then raises consumer sur-  and U4 - rz  > 0, then g 7 
plus via its effect of raising x*. 
y  effects consumer surplus only via its effect on network size.  If 
h > o, so that a tax reduces sales in both markets, then the effect by 
means of y also reduces consumer surplus if  U3 - r3 > 0. 
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y* also affects consumer surplus only through its effect on network 
size. If G < 0,  h > 0,  then the tax raises y* thereby raising the network 
for the foreign firm and raising consumer surplus if  U, - r; > 0. 
The total  effect  of a tax  on consumer surplus is  therefore  rather 
complicated and consumer surplus could rise or fall with a tax. For the 
Cournot example previously discussed, if  the average increase in  the 
willingness to pay associated with an increase in network size exceeds 
the marginal increase in the willingness to pay, and direct effects on 
surplus by x  and y outweigh the relatively indirect ones by x*  and y*, 
a tax reduces consumer surplus. Thus, if a subsidy is called for because 
of strategic considerations in maximizing W-,  it will also raise consumer 
surplus. 
Exactly the same procedure can be used to define the welfare effects 
of  a tax or subsidy when the products are compatible. The analogous 
expression to equation (15) is somewhat formidable. With compatible 
products  Ww  is given by 
Wn  = r[x,  x*, e(x + x*  + y + y*)l 
+ R[y, y*, e(x + x*  + y + y*)l -  c(x  + y). 
Then, 
+ (g - y)r2 + h(G - r)R, - 
):a 
Notice that even with compatible products there is a role for sub- 
sidizing domestic consumption of the domestic firm. If, for example, 
e-  E>O,~=  y<O,G=y<O,h>O,-<<and[(1  +g)+ 
< 0 for t  close to zero, so that a subsidy 
d W- 
(1  + G)h] > 0, then - 
dt 
raises domestic profits. However, with compatible products, some of the 
benefits of a larger network accrue to the foreign firm, and even if e >  E, 
it may not be worthwhile subsidizing domestic consumption in order to 
shift profits. This is captured by the fact that (1  + g) + (1 + G)h is re- 
quired to be positive as well in this case. Also, 
Wc = U[x,  x*,  e(x + x* + y + y*)] - r[x,  x*,  e(x + x* + y  + y*)l 
dx 
dt 
- r*[x,  x*,  e(x + x* + y + y*)l. 
Therefore, 304  Kala Krishna 
+ [u2 - r; + (u3 -  r3 - rl)e -  r21g 
dx  + [(u3 - r3 - r;)el(h + Gh)}-  . 
dt 
It can, however, be analyzed as was done for incompatible products. 
The basic message of this section and the last one is fairly clear. If 
firms tend to underestimate the benefits of output increases in creating 
network externalities, there will be a role for government intervention 
both  to shift profits to domestic firms from foreign firms in  a third 
market, and to use subsidies on domestic sales to help their competitive 
position in foreign markets where it may be illegal to offer such sub- 
sidies. In addition, such subsidies may also raise consumer surplus. 
This should not be taken as a call for government action to subsidize 
domestic production for the domestic market for at least three reasons. 
First, governments may not be informed enough to identify a welfare- 
increasing policy. Second, even if  a welfare-increasing policy is iden- 
tified,  the  government  may  not  be  able  to implement  it  since  the 
possibility  of  subsidization  may  unleash  lobbying efforts which  en- 
dogenously determine the policy as well  as waste resources.  Third, 
foreign governments may well retaliate with consequent possible losses 
for all parties. However, since these domestic subsidies are legal under 
the GATT, governments will be tempted to use them in the hope that 
they  will  be beneficial.  For this  reason  trade  policy  toward  certain 
high-tech industries could easily be conducted in  an extremely non- 
cooperative way with consequent losses for all parties. 
11.4  Other Features of  High-Tech Industries 
There are other characteristics of high-tech industries that make this 
sector special and pose difficulties for the trading system. One feature 
of  such industries, which is also related to the existence of network 
externalities, is that firms have a choice of what product standards to 
adopt or which network to link to. This choice is often posed as one 
of  deciding whether to make one’s product compatible with a com- 
petitor’s products. This matter has at least two aspects that are relevant 
for trade policy. The first is that in an effort to keep out competition, 
firms may deny networks linkages to competitors by making their prod- 
uct  incompatible  with products of foreign firms, thereby  effectively 
impeding competition. Often international competition is more effective 
in holding down excess profits than domestic competition, given the 
size of some firms in these industries. 305  High-Tech Trade Policy 
Aho and Aronson (1985) recognize this problem. They point out that 
“except for the United States and Canada almost all major countries 
provide  telecommunication  services  through  government-owned  or 
-controlled postal, telegraph, and telephone authorities. Neither group 
of countries is likely to abandon their regulatory preferences; therefore, 
rules need to be negotiated to allow for fair competition between public 
and private sector firms” (Ah0 and Aronson 1985, 147). 
The second trade policy aspect of  such compatibility decisions is 
that trade restrictions in product lines where network externalities are 
important may well affect the nature of compatibility choice. The man- 
ner in which they might do so is not well understood at present. 
High-tech  industries are also characterized  by  high  rates of tech- 
nological change and the presence of very significant rates of experience 
effects. For example, the capabilities of a modern personal computer 
worth $2,000 are equivalent to those of a mainframe computer that 
cost several million dollars in the early seventies. Nor is the end in 
sight for this technological  revolution.  Technological change has re- 
duced the real price of a unit of computing capacity in the semicon- 
ductor industry by 99 percent between 1976 and 1984.21 
In the semiconductor industry there are also significant experience 
effects. This comparative advantage in such industries can be “made” 
to a large extent.22  This puts enormous pressure on governments to 
act to secure the advantages brought by experience for domestic firms, 
since these industries are likely to be critical ones, both economically 
and for national security. Recent work by Baldwin and Krugman (1986) 
paints a convincing picture using a simulation model, that current Jap- 
anese superiority in semiconductors may well be due to the effective 
closure of the Japanese market to foreign firms that allowed Japanese 
firms to benefit from experience  While this may lead to ad- 
vantages for a country if  it is the only one operating such policies, it 
is likely to be mutually destructive if  all countries subsidize particular 
high-tech industries to gain an experience advantage. 
Still another feature of  high-tech industries is their extremely high 
level of research and development expenditure and the related problem 
in  enforcing property rights, especially for software. Since counter- 
feiting is becoming a significant trade problem for some high-tech in- 
dustries, it is important to consider ways of regulating property rights 
optimally in this area.24 
Finally, there are likely to be large switching costs and coordination 
problems in  high-tech industries where many possible  standards are 
possible ex ante. For example, it has been suggested that although the 
DVORAK  typing board is more efficient than the QWERTY 
even allowing for retraining costs, the latter remains the standard.26 
This makes  it  important for national  policy on  standards to be for- 
mulated at an early stage. 306  Kala Krishna 
Table 11.1  Leading Items Exported to the European Community (EC), by  Schedule 
B Items, 1983-85  (in thousands of dollars) 
Schedule B 















Filler tobacco, cigarette leaf, 
stemmed and unstemmed 
Soybeans, other than seed for 
planting 
Other animal feeds and ingredients 
thereof, n.s.p.f. 
Wood pulp; rag pulp; and other 
pulps derived from cellulosic 
fibrous materials and suitable for 
papermaking 
Chemical mixtures and 
preparations, n .e.  s. 
Coal; petroleum and other coke; 
compositions of coal, coke, or 




Parts of compression-ignition 
piston-type engines, and non- 
piston-type engines 
Excavating, leveling, boring, 
extracting machinery, excluding 
machinery, excluding front-end 
loaders, pile drivers, not self- 
propelled snowplows, and parts 
Digital machines comprising in one 
housing the central processing unit 
and input and output unit 
capability 
Digital central processing units, 
auxiliary storage units, input, 
units; output units, and 
combinations thereof 
Parts of automatic data processing, 
photocopying, calculating, and 
similar machines incorporating a 
calculating mechanism 
Machines not specially provided 
for, and parts thereof 
Electrical apparatus for making, 
breaking, protecting, or connecting 
to electrical circuits, switchboards, 






































367,746  509,823  589,520 
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Table 11.1  (continued) 
Schedule B 
Item No.  Description  I983  1984  1985 
687.60  Electronic tubes, transistors, 
integrated circuits, diodes, 
rectifiers, mounted piezoelectric, 
related electronic crystal 
components, parts 
Parts of motor vehicles, n.e.s. 
Parts, for aircraft and spacecraft 
measuring or checking electrical 
quantities, except electricity 
meters, and parts thereof 
$1001, except shipments requiring 
a validated export license' 
Total 
Total, U.S. exports to the EC 
692.29 
694.40  Airplanes 
694.65 
712.50  Instruments and apparatus for 
818.90  General merchandise valued under 
630,077 
404,148 






















Source: From the 37th  Report  on the  Operations of  the Trade Agreements  Program.  U.S. 
International Trade Commission, 1985. Table B-3, 292. 
Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown. 
*Prior to 1 January  1985, Schedule B, item 818.90 included only general merchandise valued 
at $500 or less. 
Table 11.2  Leading Items Imported from the European Community (EC), by TSUS 
Items 1983-1985  (in thousands of dollars) 
TSUS 
Item No.  Description  1983  1984  1985 
167.30  Still wine from grapes, not over 14  563,423  605,615  628,159 
percent alcohol, in containers not 
over I  gallon 
uranium oxide 
422.52  Uranium compounds except  429,775  546,634  600,701 
475.10  Crude petroleum, topped crude  4,360,843  4,683.164  2.999.563 
~~ 
petroleum, crude shale oil, distillate 
and residual fuel oils, testing 25 
degrees a.p.i. or more 
jet fuel 
set, suitable for jewelry 
475.25  Motor fuel, including gasoline and  801,491 
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Table 11.2  (continued) 
TSUS 















660.61  Internal combustion engines, non- 
piston-type, for aircraft, certified for 
use in civil aircraft 
Parts for internal combustion 
engines, certified for use in civil 
aircraft 
Accounting, computing, and other 
data-processing machines 
Office machine parts, n.e.s. 
Machines, n.s.p.f.,  and parts thereof 
Passenger automobiles, 
snowmobiles, trucks valued under 
$1000, and other miscellaneous 
vehicles 
Parts n.s.p.f. of motor vehicles not 
allowed nor advanced beyond 
cleaning, partly machined 
Tractors suitable for agricultural use 
and parts thereof 
Airplanes and parts thereof of civil 
aircraft and spacecraft 
Leather footwear n.e.s., valued over 
$2.50 per pair, not for men, youths, 
or boys 
Electrical measuring, checking, 
analyzing, or automatically 
controlling instruments or apparatus, 
n.s.p.f., and parts thereof 
Jewelry and other objects of 
personal adornment, of precious 
metals, n.e.s. 
Paintings, pastels, drawings, and 
sketchings executed wholly by hand, 
orginal or not 
U.S. goods returned 
Under $251 formal and informal 
entries, and nonexempt items from 
$251 to $1,000. estimated? 
Total 




















































Source: From the 37th Report on the Operations of the Trade Agreements Program. U.S. Inter- 
national Trade Commission, 1985. Table B-4, 293. 
Note: Because of rounding, figures may not add to the totals shown. 
tPrior to  1 January 1985, TSUS Item 999.95 included only formal and informal entries under 
$251. 309  High-Tech Trade Policy 
Notes 
1. For a discussion of the nature of such externalities, see Katz and Shapiro 
(1985). 
2. The classic example of this comes from the computer industry. Although 
when the Macintosh came out it was universally regarded as a far superior 
machine than the IBM PC, its main competitor, the expectation that the IBM 
machines would ultimately set the industry standard gave IBM a definite com- 
petitive edge over Apple. See Pepper (1986) for a discussion of this. 
3. See Dixit (1984, 1985) and Grossman and Richardson (1985) for a survey 
of this work. 
4. In particular, the work of Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Bulow, Gean- 
akoplos, and Klemperer (1985) have contributed to this. 
5. It is worth emphasizing that the government may not know which way 
to precommit, and even if it does, it may not be able to do so credibly. 
6.  See Bulow,  Geanakoplos, and  Klemperer (1985) and Fundenberg and 
Tirole (1984) for more on this topic. Multimarket  interactions exist when a 
firm’s behavior in one market affects its optimal behavior in another. 
7. This could be accomplished by a domestic consumption subsidy on the 
firm’s product or a production subsidy coupled with a requirement that the 
subsidy be rebated if the product is exported. 
8. This is of course assuming no retaliation! 
9. See Bresnehan (1981), Perry (1982), and Kamien and Schwartz (1983) on 
conjectural variations  and consistent conjectural variations.  There may be 
significant problems with the existence of an  equilibrium in such models, which 
are not addressed in this paper. 
10. The usual objections to conjectural variations in game theory, such as 
the lack of an  extensive form associated with the game, are important to note. 
Nevertheless it remains a useful tool. 
11. In general NE  and NE  could also enter P and P* respectively, and this 
can easily be incorporated in the framework provided. A model which provides 
a special case of the one presented is that of Katz and Shapiro (1985). In their 
model goods are perfect  substitutes for each other so that inverse demand 
depends on total output and own expected network size. 
12. Of course, the usual assumption of a numeraire good is made. 
13. There are often multiple equilibria in such models as a result of the usual 
bootstrapping phenomena associated with expectations. That is, there may be 
many expectations that are consistent in the sense’of being self-fulfilling.  It 
remains possible, however, to do comparative statics by choosing any one of 
these, since they are locally unique. 
14. A firm is said to regard its product as a strategic substitute (complement) 
for its competitors if more aggressive behavior by its rival lowers (raises) the 
marginal profitability of more aggressive behavior by itself. 
15. The assumptions made in fig.  11.1 ensure that the equilibrium is unique. 
There may in general be many fulfilled-expectations equilibria. There are usu- 
ally  only  a finite  number of  these, which  ensures local  uniqueness  of  an 
equilibrium. 
16. These diagrams are similar to those in Krugman (1984). 
17. This is  because nonconstant marginal  costs can provide  another link 
across markets. See Krugman (1984) for an analysis of such interactions. 310  Kala Krishna 
18. In addition, when E, and/or R, are large enough, the terms multiplying t 
need not be positive. This must be taken into account as well. 
19. As usual, a numeraire good is assumed to exist. Demand arises from 
utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. Also, all  profits and tax 
revenues are returned to consumers in a lump sum manner. 
20.  It is assumed that P3[0,  x*, e(x  + y)] = 0, which is  reasonable since if 
no units are purchased, there is no  reason to value increments in network size. 
21. See Baldwin and Krugman (1986). 
22. See Krugman (1985) for a model that shows how comparative advantage 
23. Baldwin and Krugman (1986) argue that this was destructive even in the 
24. Recent work by Grossman and Shapiro (1986) is a step in this direction. 
25. See, for example, David (1984). 
26. See Farrell and Saloner (1985) for a model that addresses such inertia. 
can be “made.” 
Japanese case. 
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